Inside the CIA Operation That Brought Down A.Q. Khan’s Nuclear Network

Pakistan, Nov 24 : Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan’s vast proliferation network operated undetected for years before the world fully grasped its global reach. For the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), exposing and dismantling this shadowy system became one of its most complex counter proliferation missions relying on deception, technical sabotage, and high-stakes diplomatic encounters.

In an interview with ANI, former CIA operations officer James Lawler, a key figure in Washington’s counter-proliferation efforts, offered a rare inside account of how the U.S. infiltrated and crippled the network and ultimately confronted Pakistan with what he called “absolutely incontrovertible evidence.”

How the CIA First Uncovered Khan’s Global Trafficking Operation

Lawler said the U.S. closely monitored Khan’s role in Pakistan’s nuclear programme but initially underestimated the extent of his operations abroad.

“We were very slow… We did not imagine he was going to turn around and become an outward proliferator,” he said.

Only in the 1990s after analysts connected procurement patterns across continents—did intelligence agencies realise that Khan had become a global supplier of centrifuge designs, components, missile technology, and even a Chinese atomic bomb blueprint. Lawler would later dub him the “Merchant of Death.”

The Evidence That Forced Musharraf to Act

According to Lawler, the major shift came when then CIA director George Tenet personally briefed Pakistan’s then-president Pervez Musharraf on Khan’s secret dealings.

Tenet presented proof that Khan was selling nuclear secrets to Libya and possibly other states. Lawler recalled Musharraf’s shock and anger:

“I’m going to kill that son of a b***h.”

Khan was subsequently placed under extended house arrest, stopping further overt proliferation.

Covert CIA Strategy: Front Companies, Sabotage, and ‘Becoming a Proliferator’

Lawler revealed that the CIA created fully functional overseas front companies disguised as legitimate vendors of nuclear-related parts. These entities supplied sabotaged components designed to slow or disable illicit programmes.

Describing his philosophy, Lawler said:

“If I want to defeat proliferation, I need to become a proliferator. We always did harm.”

He noted that fewer than 10 CIA officers worked exclusively on this mission at headquarters, supported by operatives worldwide.

Why Lawler Called Khan the ‘Merchant of Death’

The former officer said Khan evolved from a buyer to a global supplier of nuclear technology—selling centrifuge designs, engineering drawings, and weapons-grade know-how to multiple countries. Khan’s popularity in Pakistan and his political connections helped him build an extensive illicit marketplace.

The Libya Breakthrough: BBC China Interception

One of the CIA’s biggest victories came with the seizure of the BBC China, a freighter carrying hundreds of thousands of nuclear components bound for Libya.

Lawler described the moment the confiscated material was shown to Libyan officials:

“You could have heard a pin drop.”

Libya eventually dismantled its nuclear programmen a breakthrough Lawler celebrated, convinced it prevented a future crisis.

How Iran Benefited From Khan’s Network

Lawler said Iran acquired both P1 and P2 centrifuge designs originally stolen from URENCO and likely received missile technology and a Chinese nuclear weapon design.

“I think they got all of it,” he warned.

He said a nuclear-armed Iran could trigger a regional “nuclear pandemic.”

Why the U.S. Moved Slowly in the Early Years

Lawler dismissed claims of Saudi influence and instead attributed delays to Cold War priorities, limited resources, and simultaneous geopolitical crises. Only in the 1990s did counter proliferation become a top priority, he said. After 9/11, the CIA also monitored Pakistan’s nuclear assets to ensure Khan had no ties to al-Qaeda.

What Alarmed Washington

The danger was not merely one nuclear-armed nation but the cascading effect it could create. Lawler said a nuclear-armed Iran would make it “almost inevitable” that other regional powers would pursue nuclear capabilities—dramatically increasing the risk of conflict.

The Origin of Lawler’s Nickname: ‘Mad Dog’

Lawler traced his nickname to an incident in France when he fought off a potentially rabid German shepherd. After jokingly listing people he would “bite” if he developed rabies, colleagues began calling him “Mad Dog”—a name that stayed with him.

India–U.S. Cooperation and South Asia’s Nuclear Stability

Lawler described past India–U.S. ties as “in between,” but stressed that deeper cooperation today is vital. Any nuclear exchange in South Asia, he warned, would leave “only losers.”

Lawler’s Legacy After 25 Years at the CIA

Lawler, who served from 1980 to 2005, now writes spy novels based on his career. Looking back, he said he was proud of one central mission:

“Stopping countries from getting nuclear weapons — nobody should really argue with that.”